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5Abstract
This working paper1 assesses the interaction between 
local and international peacebuilding actors. Previous 
research has usually either focused on the internati-
onal or local side of this interaction. The authors who 
focus on the international side often inherently defi-
ne peacebuilding as being conducted by international 
actors. Thereby, they do not consider local peacebuil-
ding actors as distinct units of analysis. If local pea-
cebuilding actors are considered as subjects in their 
own right, the analysis of interaction between them 
and international peacebuilding actors is often redu-
ced to an assessment of how the latter can support 
the former. Although the introduction of concepts such 
as local ownership or hybridity have led to a stronger 
focus on the interaction between the local and interna-
tional level, they often oppose the international ‘liberal 
peace’ to local actors in general, subsuming under the 
category ‘local’ a whole array of different actors ranging 
from local communities to local peacebuilding actors, 
national elites and governmental actors. Virtually the 
only publications that have provided insights on how 
local and international peacebuilding actors interact 
are policy-related reports. They often explain the lack 
of cooperation as due to a power asymmetry based 
on the unequal resources of local and international 
peacebuilding actors. Based on the case study of the 
northeastern district of Ituri in the Democratic Repu-
blic of Congo, this working paper seeks to provide an 
alternative explanation, focusing on the perceptions 
that each set of actors has of resources, capacities and 
legitimacy. This allows insights for a more balanced 
and ultimately more relevant approach for both, inter-
national and local peacebuilding actors.
 1 This working paper is based on research 
for a doctoral thesis on the interaction 
between local and international peacebuil-
ding actors in Ituri, Democratic Republic of 
Congo from 1999 to 2012. It was supported 
by the Swiss National Science Foundation, 
the Freie Akademische Gesellschaft Basel 
and swisspeace.
 Related publications include Hellmüller, 
S. and Santschi, M. (eds.) (2013). Is Local 
Beautiful? Peacebuilding between Inter-
national Interventions and Locally Led Ini-
tiatives. Heidelberg: Springer Verlag; Hell-
müller, S. (2013). The Power of Perceptions: 
Localizing International Peacebuilding 
Approaches. International Peacekeeping, 
20(2), 219-32; Hellmüller, S. (2012). The 
Ambiguities of Local Ownership: Evidence 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
African Security, 5(3-4), 236-54.
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2 Interview #106 with national elite actor, 
Kinshasa, 2012. 
It has become a truism that local and international forces need to be joined in 
order to build sustainable peace. As a Congolese respondent stated in an 
interview I conducted in Ituri, 
“each actor has a place, so we need to build together. There is not one person 
who can have the place by him- or herself, just like there is not one person who 
knows the reality alone, like there is not one person who has the solution 
alone. The solution always has to be found together, to be built together, to be 
engaged together, and to be developed together”.2 
 Indeed, several authors have provided insights into the interaction 
between the local and the international level in peacebuilding. Thereby, they 
have, however, implicitly tended to focus either on the international or the 
local side. 
 The authors who have focused on international aspects of this inter-
action, often inherently define peacebuilding as being conducted by interna-
tional actors (Barnett et al., 2007: 36; Donais, 2012: 31). As Call and Cook 
(2003: 238) state, peacebuilding literature often takes for granted their focus 
on international actors as the latter are assumed to have the lead in 
addressing conflict-affected contexts. Pearce (1997: 451) shows how external 
peacebuilding agencies tend to “focus the debate on their interventions (for 
instance, what they can do to articulate relief and development, what they can 
do to prevent conflict and build peace), and much less on the dynamic of local 
capacities and how they can shape the future prospects for peace-building”. 
Thereby, local peacebuilding actors are not taken as distinct units of analysis 
in research (Alger, 2007). Indeed, in current scholarly approaches to under-
standing peacebuilding, agency is often seen as lying nearly exclusively with 
international actors. This does not mean that these contributions do not talk 
about local aspects or even conduct their research in order to improve inter-
national – local interactions, but they often portray local actors as the ‘object’ 
of peacebuilding, but seldom as the ‘subject’ and actors in their own right 
(Mac Ginty, 2011c: 31; Donais, 2012).
 
 The authors who have focused mainly on local aspects of the interaction 
between the international and the local side, usually concentrate on local civil 
society in general and its role in peacebuilding (e.g. Pouligny, 2005; 
Paffenholz, 2010; Kanol, 2010). Such authors have assessed different local 
peace initiatives and have shown that they can make a positive difference for 
peace (e.g. Tongeren, 1999; Prendergast and Plumb, 2002; Call and Cook, 2003: 
243-4; Tongeren, 2005; Haider, 2009). However, they often do not provide an 
in-depth analysis of how these different local efforts interact with and link up 
to international peacebuilding programs. If they do, it is often limited to 
reflections on how international peacebuilding actors can better support such 
local initiatives and less how these local actors could contribute to improving 
international peacebuilding programs (Hoksbergen, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2009; 
Donais, 2012: 139-53). For instance, research often turns more around how 
international peacebuilding actors can strengthen the capacities of local 
7peacebuilding actors rather than in what ways the latter can also improve 
international programs by making them locally more relevant. 
 
 While some authors provide insights into interactional elements, these 
are, however, either on the interaction exclusively amongst international 
actors or the interaction between international peacebuilding actors on the 
one hand and local actors in general on the other hand. With regard to the 
former, they inquire as to how different international actors, i.e. United 
Nations (UN) agencies, UN peacekeeping missions and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), coordinate their activities amongst 
each other and not how they interact with local peacebuilding actors (e.g. 
Ricigliano, 2003; Lipson, 2005; Herrhausen, 2007; Cooley and Ron, 2002; 
Campbell and Hartnett, 2005). Concerning the latter, some authors have 
addressed the interaction between the local and the international level, but 
none has focused specifically on peacebuilding actors on both sides. Barnett 
and Zürcher (2009), for instance, provide a framework in which they assess the 
interaction between international peacebuilding actors and local elites (at the 
national and subnational level). While highly useful as a framework of analysis, 
this implicitly defines peacebuilding again as mainly being conducted by 
international actors. Research based on the concepts of local ownership and 
hybridity has also focused on the interaction between the local and the 
international level (Reich, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d; 
Richmond, 2012; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Donais, 2012), but often oppose 
the ‘liberal peace’3 on the international side to ‘local actors’ more generally.
 Virtually the only publications focusing directly on the interaction 
between local and international peacebuilding actors are policy related 
research pieces (Anderson and Olson, 2003: 35-45; McGuinness, 2012). Thus, 
while a better cooperation between local and international actors in peace-
building is often portrayed as necessary but to date still insufficient, empirical 
data to underline the necessity as well as reasons for this insufficiency are 
rarely given. In this working paper, I seek to address this gap by not taking 
either the international peacebuilding intervention or local civil society actors 
as the main object of inquiry, but by assessing the interaction between the 
different local and international actors engaged in peacebuilding. I assess this 
interaction from a multitude of local and international perspectives, rather 
than just the international one. For this purpose, I have chosen a localized 
case study of Ituri, a district in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). I analyzed the different perceptions of local and international peace-
building actors in Ituri in 135 interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in 
four field visits between 2011 and 2013.4
 In this working paper, I attempt to explain why the interaction between 
local and international peacebuilding actors is often characterized by rivalry 
rather than cooperation which ultimately makes both their programs less 
effective. Most authors attribute the lack of cooperation to power 
asymmetries between the two, which are based on their unequal access to 
funding (Anderson and Olson, 2003: 62; Van Brabant, 2010: 8; Mac Ginty, 
 3 The liberal peace theory is based on the 
belief that “in the long term the best 
chance for stable peace to take root in 
international society will be if all its mem-
bers are liberal democracies” (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2004: 4-5).
 4 I also interviewed national staff of inter-
national peacebuilding organizations. 
If they talked to me in their capacity as 
staff of the organization, I analyzed their 
responses as part of the international 
peacebuilding actors’ perspectives. If they 
responded to me as person having lived 
through the conflict in Ituri, I counted them 
within the respondent category of the local 
population. This sometimes also changed 
from one question to the other within one 
interview.
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82011c). I seek to provide an alternative explanation. I argue that local and 
international peacebuilding actors in Ituri have complementary resources, 
capacities and legitimacy structures. However, rather than making use of 
these distinct comparative advantages, they perceive them in different – at 
times competitive – terms, which hampers their cooperation. Although the 
identification of these comparative advantages involves necessarily a gener-
alization and does not count for every single actor, the following tendencies 
can be observed.5
 International peacebuilding actors’ comparative advantages with regard 
to resources are that they often have the required funding to implement 
large-scale projects. They are familiar with fundraising procedures, have the 
necessary access to donors and can thus mobilize substantial amounts of 
money. International peacebuilding actors are said to attract the ‘big funds’ 
which is seen as a positive aspect by local peacebuilding actors who often 
also at least partially benefit from it. In that sense they can implement 
substantive programs with a visible impact, at least in the short term. 
Concerning capacities, international peacebuilding actors are seen as bringing 
the expertise on best practices and lessons learned of how to respond to 
conflicts. Even though they might have gathered these experiences in other 
contexts, lessons can still be drawn and capacities and skills transferred 
– after the necessary adaptations and with the required humility. The 
knowledge that international peacebuilding actors provide on different 
aspects related to statebuilding, for instance, is often perceived as being 
crucially important. Finally, concerning legitimacy, international actors are 
often seen as valuable outsiders when impartial forces are difficult to find 
within the conflict context. An external intervention is usually considered 
necessary in the beginning in order to stabilize a region and to create the 
space for longer term approaches. 
 Local peacebuilding actors’ comparative advantages concerning 
resources are that they are more cost-effective. They can implement projects 
without large bureaucratic procedures and operate from modest offices with 
limited logistics. Moreover, their personnel costs are often substantially lower 
than the ones of expatriates. Their different activities are usually imple-
mented with very low budgets when compared to international programs. 
Their work is also said to have a big symbolic impact, in addition to more 
tangible ones. If the population realizes that some of their compatriots have 
started working for peace, it usually sends a stronger message than if interna-
tional peacebuilding actors implement similar peacebuilding activities. 
Concerning capacities, local peacebuilding actors have substantive context 
knowledge. Local actors who are from Ituri also speak the local languages and 
know the cultural specificities of the conflict context. This also gives them 
access to remote areas where international actors are often not present due 
to security restrictions. Lastly, their legitimacy is based on the fact that they 
have lived through the conflict. This legitimacy is further enhanced because 
beneficiaries know that they will stay in the area even if international 
 5 These tendencies are mainly derived from 
interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) 
and participant observations. They were 
also checked against the literature (see 
for instance Anderson and Olson, 2003; 
Hansen, 2008; Autesserre, 2014).
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9peacebuilding actors withdraw. This creates trust in their approach as they 
themselves have to live with the consequences of their own programs. 
 This short overview of comparative advantages shows that local and 
international peacebuilding actors have complementary resources, capacities 
and legitimacy structures. To be sure, these need to be assessed in every 
context anew, but the overview presented above points to the argument that 
each set of actors has its place. As one local interlocutor stated, “peace in 
Ituri has many fathers, everyone has contributed”.6 Anderson and Olson (2003: 
37) also observe that, “when they work together insiders and outsiders bring 
different and distinct qualities to peace partnerships”. This is, however, often 
not made use of. Richmond (2010: 685) notes that “both local and international 
offer a public transcript framed in mutually understandable language about 
how each may help each other, but there is a hidden transcript which betrays a 
lack of understanding, care or agreement, and antagonistic relations of 
domination and resistance”. This is also visible on the ground where “the 
relationship between outsiders and insiders in peacebuilding contexts is 
typically marked more by conflict than by collaboration” (Donais, 2012: 34, 74). 
Thus, the interaction between local and international peacebuilding actors is 
often characterized by rivalry, rather than cooperation and neither actor 
benefits from the above mentioned comparative advantages. While they are 
aware of these complementary assets, in practice they often act more 
according to competitive perceptions of their own and each other’s resources, 
capacities and legitimacy. In what follows, I assess these different percep-
tions as an explanation for their hampered cooperation. 






The Assessment of Resources
1.1 Donor Dependency
One image held by international peacebuilding actors is that local peace-
building actors have developed an attitude of expectations towards interna-
tional funds. They are accused of ‘mushrooming’ after a violent conflict, and of 
only being created because donor money has become available (Veit, 2010: 211 
(in Ituri); Schwarz, 2004: 10; Pouligny, 2005; Reich, 2006). This accusation of 
mushrooming is linked to the image that local peacebuilding organizations are 
highly donor dependent. Therefore, so the perception goes, they react to the 
availability of funds, rather than local needs and also stop their activities as 
soon as donor money finishes. Nagelhus Schia and Karlsrud (2012: 21) write 
that local peacebuilding actors are often perceived as having been set up 
merely to respond to funding. This was also echoed in interviews with interna-
tional organizations in Ituri. As one respondent said “it is more of a solution to 
unemployment, a need for money. Money circulates, and one creates an 
organization”.7 This also implies that many international peacebuilding actors, 
especially UN agencies, lament a perception of them as mere channels of 
funding. As one UN agency representative said “for [local peacebuilding 
actors], everything always turns around finances”.8 At the same time, local 
organizations are accused of disappearing as soon as donor money finishes. 
As was observed by one interlocutor, “there are organizations that open today 
and close tomorrow according to the funds available”.9 Thus, the view is that 
as Carl (2003: 3) states, “they may spring up overnight in response to donor 
agendas and outsiders’ institutional needs, and vanish just as quickly”. 
 Based on that, international actors say that the cooperation with local 
peacebuilding actors sometimes poses problems because the latter always 
expect funding from international actors. This has also influenced how they 
assess the power balance between themselves and local actors. This power 
relationship is often evaluated according to who brings the finances. Indeed, 
the financial resources that international actors put into conflict contexts are 
substantial and allow for example for the provision of social services, the 
holding of elections, the reform of different state sectors, or the conduct of 
different trainings and reintegration programs for ex-combatants. The fact 
that international actors hold the ‘purse strings’ and local actors want to 
receive the money is said to give the former substantial power (Van Brabant, 
2010: 8; Mac Ginty, 2011c: 84; Donais, 2012: 71). 
 However, from a local peacebuilding actor’s perspective, these 
arguments are not perceived in the same way. For most of them, the term 
‘mushrooming’ refers more to the deployment of international organizations 
than to the creation of local peacebuilding organizations. The increase in 
numbers of local peacebuilding organizations is in their view negligible when 
compared to the arrival of the high numbers of international NGOs and UN 
agencies in Ituri. As stated by Pouligny (2006: 116), in Bunia, the district capital 
of Ituri, “the impressive deployment is made in zones that resemble no man’s 
land rather than towns, the shock produced by the encounter is surreal, even 
to a visitor used to such situations” (see also Zahar, 2012: 81). This impression 
 7 Interview #18 with UN representative 
(national staff), Bunia, 2011.
8 Interview #46 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2012.
9 Interview #44 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2012.
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of ‘mushrooming’ is not only linked to numbers, but also to the way in which 
space is occupied. The most central places in Bunia are dominated by interna-
tional actors with the headquarters and recreation house of the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (Monusco) in the center of town 
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UN Habitat right 
next to it on the main boulevard. Thus, from a local perspective, international 
actors have also physically ‘mushroomed’ in Bunia.
 Local peacebuilding actors also have different views on the two related 
points about responding to availability of funds, rather than needs and the 
ending of programs as soon as the donor money finishes. With regard to the 
first, being aware of this commonly made accusation to only work for peace 
because it is a lucrative business, many local respondents underlined that 
they had already been active in peace promotion before international donors’ 
focus had turned towards Ituri. From a local actor’s perspective the creation 
of a peacebuilding organization is not caused by the availability of funds, but 
by needs. Thus, they say that it was a logical reallocation of resources: if you 
had an organization working on development, education, or undernour-
ishment, you could not work anymore during the war, so you needed to 
address other issues – peacebuilding issues – first. Moreover, even if this 
accusation might hold for some local peacebuilding organizations, they noted 
that it was not so different for international actors. They allegedly also “lived 
from these conflicts” since they would also be unemployed without them.10  
 With regard to the second point, the sustainability of their presence, 
local peacebuilding actors stated that “internationals come with big money, 
but as soon as the budget finishes, the edifice crumbles which poses risks for 
sustainability”.11 Thus, they are equally seen as heavily dependent on the 
availability of resources and have to leave Ituri once the funds are used. This is 
not only seen as a problem in itself because of the expectations created, but 
also leads to longer term complications as the presence of international 
peacebuilding organizations usually highly distorts the local economy.12 As 
stated “the problem is that the UN is a big source of income for so many 
people in Bunia (wards, staff, housekeepers, etc.). So if they leave, what will 
happen?”13 Local peacebuilding actors, in contrast, are considered to be more 
sustainable because they have often worked for years without substantial 
funding and are thus also likely to continue their activities even in times of a 
tighter budget. International organizations, however, according to most of the 
local peacebuilding actors interviewed, often quit very abruptly and are said 
to “leave the population waiting”.14
 Thus, from a local perspective, donor dependency was equally an issue 
for international peacebuilding actors. Indeed, the latter also need to find a 
compromise to respect what donors see as a priority. Although international 
organization representatives interviewed underlined that they had some 
flexibility to adapt their programs to the situation analysis they conduct, they 
often saw donors as not flexible enough to align the budget to eventualities in 
the field.
 10 Interview #36 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Nyankunde, 2012; also FGD #3 
with professor and local peacebuilding 
actor, Bunia, 2011.
11 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding  
actors, Bunia, 2011.
12 Interviews and FGDs with local  
peacebuding actors,  
Ituri district, 2011-2013.
13 FGD #53 with UN representatives 
(international staff), Bunia, 2012.
14 Interview #37 with district authority, 
Bunia, 2012.
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1.2 Access to Resources
Not only donor dependency, but also access to resources is perceived in 
different terms from local or international perspectives. Local peacebuilding 
organizations work with less financial resources than international ones. The 
most commonly known local peacebuilding actors in Ituri in 2010 had an 
annual budget of between US$ 200’000 and US$ 400’000 (USAID, 2011) while 
most international NGOs started with a minimum budget of US$ 1 million. At 
the time of writing, international actors, namely UN agencies, manage the 
most important financial contributions to peacebuilding in the district of Ituri. 
UNDP, for instance, administers the Pooled Fund, a Common Humanitarian 
Fund for the DRC. Even though it was created in response to the Humanitarian 
Action Plan, its programs also encompass peacebuilding activities. It had a 
budget of US$ 107.2 million for the DRC in 2011 which represented 24% of all 
humanitarian projects financed in Ituri (OCHA/UNDP, 2011). 
 Two factors make access to funding difficult from a local peacebuilding 
actor’s perspective. First is the fact that donors and UN agencies usually 
request rather cumbersome procurement procedures and in-depth capacity 
assessments of local peacebuilding actors for which the latter often do not 
have the resources to invest in (Faubert, 2006: 4, 24; Samset and Madore, 
2006: 17). For instance, in the UNDP ‘Peacebuilding and Community Devel-
opment Project’ implemented between 2003 and 2006, local peacebuilding 
organizations could propose micro-projects. However, these projects needed 
to be approved at the level of Kinshasa and financial management and 
disbursal was equally centralized to Kinshasa (Samset and Madore, 2006: 13). 
This led to frequent delays and long procedures. As summarized by Faubert 
(2006: 31), “UNDP is perceived as a slow, well-entrenched bureaucracy where 
internal processes take precedence over operational effectiveness [with] a 
long lead-time for project approval, delays in transferring funds and unreal-
istic demands for detailed financial justifications”. Most international organi-
zations also have budgetary limits for the contracts they can conclude with 
local organizations. UNDP, for instance, has discretionary authority for 
projects of up to US$ 30’000 (Faubert, 2006: 34). The same limits are imposed 
on the Quick Impact Projects that can potentially be given to local organiza-
tions by the Monusco civil affairs section (CAS) which are limited to US$ 
25’000. This constrains the types of projects that can be subcontracted to 
local peacebuilding actors.
 Moreover, in order to be eligible for Pooled Fund money for instance, 
local peacebuilding organizations have to “complete an in-depth capacity 
assessment” (OCHA/UNDP, 2011: 13). This assessment includes a review of 
their institutional, financial, administrative and technical capacities. Once an 
organization has been judged eligible, it also undergoes a risk assessment in 
order to reveal its institutional, administrative and financial weaknesses. The 
generated risk factor (low, moderate, significant, high) determines the 
frequency of reports required from the organization and monitoring visits by 
evaluators. Local NGOs are considered a higher risk than international ones:  
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in the eligibility assessment of 2011, 44 out of 94 local NGOs were considered 
to be high risk (46%) while only 5 out of 63 international ones were judged to 
be high risk (7%) (OCHA/UNDP, 2011: 13). Local peacebuilding actors often see 
these procurement and capacity assessment processes as burdensome and 
the amount received rather small for a more substantial engagement. They 
cannot always allow themselves to invest time (and money) in these processes 
as they most often work on a shoestring and sometimes do not even have 
enough funding to take care of their core activities.
 The second factor which makes access to funding difficult from a local 
peacebuilding actor’s perspective is the fact that international funds 
disbursed by UN agencies are often channeled through international NGOs 
who then sub-contract local peacebuilding actors instead of arriving directly 
with the latter (Hoksbergen, 2005; Pouligny, 2006: 72). With UN agencies in 
Ituri, for instance, the formula was most often that an international NGO 
would act as an “umbrella agency for smaller national and local NGOs and 
groups” (Faubert, 2006: 27).15 This was criticized by local peacebuilding actors 
as the amount of funding with which they eventually had to work was often 
very small. They said that at every step, money got lost in transaction costs 
and thus not a lot of funds actually reached the communities in the end. 
 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs 
implemented in Ituri provide a valuable example of this. The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) for instance worked with two 
American profit organizations who subcontracted international NGOs. The 
latter then also subcontracted local organizations. It is clear that this not only 
made the process more complex, but also that a lot of money was wasted. As 
stated by one observer, “the worst period was the period of DDR when a shit 
load of money came in and overheads were shocking. In the end, what the 
small ex-combatant received was peanuts compared with what the whole 
chain above him received”.16 Moreover, Monusco CAS was also criticized for 
having a lot of funds, “but instead of giving it to local organizations that are 
credible, they prefer to work with the money themselves”.17 Thus, local peace-
building actors are often at the end of the ‘aid supply chain’ which leads to 
frustrations and a request for the money to be channeled through them in 
more direct donor relations.
 International actors often justify the unequal access to donor money by 
accusing local peacebuilding organizations of evading funds. As one inter-
viewee stated, “corruption is an accepted evil in society”18 or even “corruption 
is in the physiology of people here”.19 However, local peacebuilding actors 
– while acknowledging the ‘evil’ of corruption in many organizations – state 
that this is not only the case for local organizations, but also international 
ones. In this regard, they most often refer to so-called ‘return operations’. 
These denote operations in which the subcontracted local peacebuilding 
organization signs a confirmation that they have received the full amount as 
foreseen in the budget while they in fact had to give part of the amount back  
to the international organization funding them. The money they return is then 
15 Interview #51 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2012.
16 Interview #112 with external expert, 
phone, 2013.
17 Interview #113 with local peacebuil-
ding actor, Bunia, 2013.
18 Interview #112 with external expert, 
phone, 2013.
19 Informal discussion #131 with inter-
national organization representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2013. 
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misappropriated. As an example: “we execute a project in partnership with [an 
international actor] with US$ 10’000. I have to tell them that I executed it with 
US$ 10’000 even if in reality I had to return US$ 4’000 and had to execute the 
project with US$ 6’000”.20 While only a handful of local peacebuilding actors 
referred to this phenomenon in interviews, when asking around most local 
organization representatives said that they were familiar with it.
 More generally, international actors are said to have much higher costs 
for the same activities. From a local viewpoint, international actors spend for 
instance too much money on things other than the projects themselves. 
Visibility signs provide an example. Such placards are widespread over the 
district and for almost every project there is a sign indicating which interna-
tional organization has implemented it. This is seen as necessary from an 
international point of view to show their donors what they have achieved. 
However, from a local point of view, this is often seen as a waste of money. As 
was stated with regard to a humanitarian project for instance, “for one water 
source there are maybe ten signposts each costing 300 dollars […]. You can 
see how much this visibility costs, so in the end what is important is not the 
service done to the beneficiary, but to see who did it”.21 This was also 
observed by Pouligny (2006: 147) who stated that “local […] actors criticize the 
[UN] missions for being more concerned with their own publicity and the 
showcase that is presented than in communicating with the country’s 
population” (see also Autesserre, 2014: 230-34). As one international peace-
building actor acknowledged, “there are organizations that work not neces-
sarily on cooperation, but on visibility. They have to show that they are doing 
things”.22
 Thus, international peacebuilding actors are seen as taking a long time 
to implement projects due to the heavy procedures.23 The privileging of 
international actors by donors and UN agencies therefore stands against the 
background that both local and international actors agree on the fact that 
local peacebuilding actors are much more cost-effective, as they can “survive 
with little”.24 This also confers them with a certain power which is beyond 
financial resources. Therefore, even though international actors usually have 
more funds, local actors can reach a higher number of people through local 
mechanisms of message propagation.25 As such, while international actors 
measure resources mainly in financial terms, locally resources are also 
understood to include the ability to achieve a longer term impact. 
20 Interview #20 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Mahagi, 2011.
21 Interview #38 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Bunia, 2012.
22 Interview #11 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2011.
23 Interviews and FGDs with local pea-
cebuilding actors and UN representa-
tives (national staff), Ituri district and 
Kinshasa, 2011-2013.
24 Interviews and FGDs with local peace-
building actors and UN representati-
ves, Ituri district, 2011-2013.
25 Interview #19 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Bunia, 2011.
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The Assessment of Capacities
A second reason for why the cooperation between international and local 
peacebuilding actors is often hampered is their assessment of capacities. The 
capacities of international peacebuilding actors are often valued more than 
the ones of local peacebuilding actors. Thus, local peacebuilding actors often 
complained in interviews and FGDs about the fact that they are usually 
portrayed as lacking capacities although they have specific context 
knowledge and methodologies adapted to the realities on the ground. 
2.1 Information and Knowledge
Information is defined by the Oxford dictionary as “facts provided or learned 
about something or someone”. Knowledge is defined as “awareness or famili-
arity gained by experience of a fact or situation”.26 While information is factual 
and thus verifiable or falsifiable, knowledge is an already verified belief. It 
connects different fragments of information and is thus a capacity, which is 
the ability to do or understand something. Local peacebuilding actors 
consider what they know about the social, economic and political context as 
knowledge and hence a capacity which international peacebuilding actors 
often lack. This knowledge is especially important in the realm of creating 
peaceful social cohabitation on which their programs are based.  
 In contrast, international peacebuilding actors see the thematic 
knowledge they have and which is to some extent transferable from one 
context to the other as an important capacity. Such external knowledge is 
often linked to principles of the ‘liberal peace’, especially with regard to how 
the state and civil society should be rebuilt. This knowledge is usually 
portrayed as being based on “non-negotiable principles that, in a sense, stand 
outside history and above politics” (Sending, 2009: 5). This non-negotiability is 
linked to the fact that many authors and practitioners see the ‘liberal peace’ 
as stemming from a global consensus, rather than seeing it as a consensus 
shared by some, but not all. External actors are hence often unwilling to 
renegotiate their concepts of peace and peacebuilding (see also Goetschel 
and Hagman, 2009: 64). 
 Thus, international actors present themselves as the technicians 
bringing expertise on specific topics. Thereby, the context knowledge of local 
peacebuilding actors is usually considered as information, rather than 
knowledge. It is seen as useful mainly to fine-tune and implement interna-
tional programs, but less to define peacebuilding priorities in the first place. 
Therefore, international actors value their own capacities mostly for strategy-
making while local knowledge is downgraded to information which is used 
mainly in the implementation phase. The question asked is not what peace 
looks like from a local perspective, but how the peace that is designed outside 
the country can best be implemented locally. As such, while both international 
and local actors agree that local peacebuilding actors are more familiar with 
the context, this contextual knowledge is often valued as less important than 
thematic knowledge. This explains why peacebuilding processes are more 26
 Available at <www.oxforddictionaries.
com>, last consulted 8.2.2014.
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strongly influenced by outside expertise than knowledge of what works in a 
given setting, what already exists in this context and what people having lived 
through the conflict might prioritize. 
 This also leads to the fact that when local peacebuilding actors are 
invited to share their context knowledge, international actors often talk about 
consultations conducted under the rationale of gathering information for the 
implementation of the latter’s programs. As a UN staff member noted, “local 
NGOs have the information, also for security”.27 Thus, local peacebuilding 
actors are mainly consulted when international actors are in need of infor-
mation, but are not really seen as equal partners with complementary capac-
ities. As one observer put it, “when they lack information, they come see us. 
Whenever there is a problem of security, they ask us”.28 Other interlocutors 
also explained that international actors only involved local organizations when 
they needed specific information critical to the implementation of their 
programs or faced security risks, but rarely to make their programs more 
locally relevant.29 The information gathered in consultations with local peace-
building actors is, moreover, usually not fed back. The reports that are written 
based on local information are rarely shared with the informants. They are 
sent to Kinshasa and the respective headquarters. Therefore, for most 
Iturians, Monusco has become a “black box, into which resources were fed 
(such as information), [but] exactly what happened to this information usually 
remained unclear” (Veit, 2010: 194). This is even more salient in the case of the 
many policy reports that are written and that influence future strategy-
making of international peacebuilding actors. 
 As a consequence of the valuation of thematic, rather than context 
knowledge by international peacebuilding actors, local actors are seen as in 
need of capacity-building for acquiring the knowledge held by international 
actors. Thus the relationship is often portrayed as one of giver and taker, or 
teacher and learner. This is also demonstrated by the fact that UN agencies 
often request international NGOs which they sub-contract to work with local 
actors in order to reinforce the latter’s capacities. As stated by one 
respondent, “international NGOs have a lot of capacities as they have worked 
in a lot of different countries and they can achieve ‘big things’, while local 
NGOs need a lot of capacity-building”.30 This view is also present in the liter-
ature. Hoksbergen (2005: 18), for instance, states “blessed with highly 
educated personnel with specialized degrees in important areas of devel-
opment, […] [Northern] NGOs strengthen Southern partners by imparting 
knowledge through workshops, classes and mentoring”. 
 A concrete example in Ituri is provided in the realm of mediation. 
Different international organizations have started to train mediators on the 
ground. As one UN staff member stated “we need to build capacities, give 
them the tools to conduct mediation. We do a lot of training on the concept 
and mechanisms of mediation”.31 Thereby, local capacities in mediation which 
are adapted to the context are often overlooked and it is often forgotten that 
these actors conduct mediations on a daily basis without their capacities 
27 Interview #11 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2011.
28 Interview #4 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Bunia, 2011.
29 Interview #5 with local peacebuil-
ding actor, Bunia, 2011; FGD #22 with 
international organization representa-
tives (national staff), Kinshasa, 2011; 
Interview #39 with UN representative 
(national staff), Bunia, 2012.
30 Interview #58 with UN representative 
(national staff), Bunia, 2012.
31 Interview #16 with UN representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2011.
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being recognized. As one local peacebuilding actor stated, “before, we did not 
have training in mediation, but we reconciled a lot of people, […] but it was 
apparently not the right technique of mediation. This was made clear to us in a 
training we received in 2010 and we had to laugh as before we did not follow 
the right technique of mediation”.32 This shows that international capacity-
building often stipulates that their approach is the right one while what local 
peacebuilding actors did before is valued as the wrong or insufficient 
approach, even though it was successful. 
 This stronger valuation of thematic expertise is sometimes also almost 
seen as an insult. This is also linked to the fact that international peace-
building organizations increasingly tend to employ very young interns and 
volunteers. While it might be an excellent opportunity for young people to gain 
experience abroad, for many local actors it is sometimes difficult to receive 
training by less experienced and younger persons. As stated by Pouligny 
(2006: 95), “local employees recall their unease at collaborating with outsiders 
in positions where they considered themselves underemployed, ill-treated or 
even humiliated because they had to receive instructions from arrogant young 
volunteers with neither their qualifications nor their experience”. In the end, it 
is not always clear what a recent graduate who might have studied conflict 
resolution or a similar topic knows in comparison to a 40 year old woman or 
man who has fought for peace throughout the conflict, but it shows again the 
preference for thematic over contextual knowledge. Thereby, it is obvious that 
this “can also be disempowering for local civil society peace activists, whose 
energy and initiative can be undermined by the cult of the outside expert” 
(Donais, 2012: 69). 
 As such, knowledge exchange is not portrayed as a two way road of 
mutual learning, but as a process with actors who benefit on one side and 
actors who provide on the other side. Thereby, international peacebuilding 
actors “assume a position of authority in knowing what needs to be done in 
countries they often know little about” (Sending, 2009: 8). There has, for 
instance, never been a seminar held by local peacebuilding actors for interna-
tional actors doing capacity-building on the Iturian context. This shows again 
how information is taken from local actors, but capacities and knowledge are 
seen as the realm of international actors. This is highly significant as it not 
only gives the international actors authority, but it also contributes to justi-
fying their presence in a conflict context. 
2.2 Logistics and Management
Local peacebuilding actors see their own needs more in the realm of logistical 
and managerial capacity-building. With regard to logistical capacities, they 
often work with very basic infrastructure as they do not have substantial core 
funding. In most local peacebuilding organizations’ offices, even basic lighting 
is lacking, the rooms are very small and internet access is usually not 
constant. Most of the organizations do not own their office buildings and thus 
32 Interview #54 with local peacebuilding 
actor, Bunia, 2012.
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have to spend part of the project money on running costs. International actors 
sometimes provide logistical support. This support is, however, most often 
limited to what is needed to implement the specific projects they are funding 
(e.g. megaphones, bicycles, office material). In other cases only the activity as 
such is funded which makes it difficult for local peacebuilding actors to even 
access the zone in which the project takes place. 
 Moreover, logistical support for projects implemented conjointly with 
international actors is not always equally distributed. For instance there was 
one case where in a proposal to a UN agency, cars were requested for the 
international NGO, but motorbikes for the local peacebuilding organizations.33  
Such actions further widen the logistical divide between international and 
local actors which is already striking to begin with as on the other side, 
international actors are heavily dependent on high-tech logistics in order to 
carry out their activities “to a speed and level of efficiency required by their 
donor governments and funding agencies” (Smirl, 2008: 241). The differences 
are obvious when spending time in Bunia. Most of the 4x4 cars in the streets 
are those of international actors (not only peacebuilding actors, but also many 
humanitarian organizations). In turn, only a very limited number of local 
peacebuilding actors own cars and most of them usually travel by foot or 
motorbike. 
 With regard to managerial capacity-building, local peacebuilding actors 
acknowledge that they sometimes do not live up to the capacities of interna-
tional peacebuilding organizations. The latter also provide support in this 
realm. UNDP for instance, in their ‘Community Empowerment and Peace-
building Project’ in Ituri implemented from 2009 to 2012 had as a specific 
objective to “enhance the organizational and technical capacities of 50 
selected community-based organizations and planning bodies in the target 
areas” (UNDP, 2008: 22). As stated, “international NGOs are expected to 
supply their management experience and know-how, and national NGOs will 
receive capacity-building through trainings and other learning opportunities” 
(UNDP, 2008: 30). 
 While appreciating such strengthening of managerial capacities, local 
peacebuilding actors often regret that what they are trained in is usually not 
where they lack most capacities. For instance, UNDP organized a capacity-
training seminar of five days in 2005 with 75 local peacebuilding actors. The 
content was the management of micro-projects, especially the planning, 
implementation and general management of such projects; monitoring, 
evaluation and auditing; and participation of local communities in the 
management of the projects (Samset and Madore, 2006: 46). However, local 
peacebuilding actors reportedly would have wished to be trained in more 
ambitious topics, such as financial and human resources management or the 
logical framework approach (Samset and Madore, 2006: 46), rather than in 
what they already had knowledge in, such as community participation. In the 
latter, they felt they had already better capacities than international peace-
building actors. One of the main areas in which they recognize their lack of 
33 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding  
actors, Bunia, 2011.
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capacities is fundraising and how to become more eligible for funds granted 
by international donors. This is, however, rarely part of such trainings as 
international and local actors compete for funding. 
 In addition to competing for funding, local and international peace-
building organizations also compete for staff. Local peacebuilding actors 
state that one reason for their lack of capacities is also the fact that interna-
tional organizations pay higher salaries. As Herrhausen (2007: 16) says, 
sometimes the “UN builds parallel structures in the countries where it 
operates; because of the higher profile it has and the better salaries it pays, it 
often depletes those structures that do exist locally”. Thus, as soon as people 
are trained by local peacebuilding organizations, they are reportedly enticed 
away by international bodies. This allegedly creates a brain drain from local to 
international organizations which makes it difficult for the former to build up 
and keep capacities. 
 The above shows that perceptions of what constitutes capacity, of who 
is in need of capacity-building and in which areas capacity building is needed, 
differ between local and international peacebuilding actors. While local 
peacebuilding actors mainly underline their knowledge of the context, interna-
tional peacebuilding actors put a strong focus on thematic knowledge of 
peacebuilding. This means that the context knowledge of local actors is not 
seen as a capacity, but rather as simple information to be used to fine-tune 
internationally funded programs in the implementation phase. In the realm of 
logistics and management, where local peacebuilding organizations 
acknowledge being in need of capacity-building, it is often provided in an 
insufficient manner. 
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The Assessment of Legitimacy
A third reason for the hampered cooperation between local and international 
actors revolves around differences in orientation for legitimacy. The legitimacy 
of an organization can be defined as “the generalized perception that an 
organization’s actions are ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate within a social 
system’” (Suchman cited in Walton, 2012: 19). From an international and a local 
standpoint, the social system within which legitimacy is evaluated differs. The 
social system of the local peacebuilding actors refers mainly to local commu-
nities while the social system of the international peacebuilding actors mostly 
refers to donors. As such, local peacebuilding actors are habitually more 
concerned with their inside legitimacy within communities as they themselves 
are part of the latter. International peacebuilding actors, in contrast, often 
assess legitimacy in relation to donors and with respect to outside factors, 
such as the ‘liberal peace’ framework and their thematic expertise.
3.1  Local Peacebuilding Actors’ Inside Orientation
Local peacebuilding actors mostly define legitimacy with regard to how they 
are perceived in the communities in which they work. As one respondent said, 
“local NGOs are closer to the communities and reflect their realities”.34 Their 
context knowledge is said to help them plan and implement programs on the 
ground. Their legitimacy is seen as mostly deriving from their being an insider 
in the communities. Because they master the local languages and are usually 
familiar with the persons they work with, they are accepted more easily. As 
one local peacebuilding actor stated, “for a real peace, the person needs to 
know you, otherwise she or he will have reservations and will not open up”.35 
Because they live in the communities and hence are permanently on the 
ground, their activities are also seen as more sustainable. As one local peace-
building actor stated, 
“international actors work according to what they have heard, but we work 
according to what we have seen and lived through. This is completely 
different. We have more interest in that the conflict does not break out again, 
in order to not return to the past. Therefore, we know better how to identify 
activities that can prevent such things”.36  
 In sum, they are largely perceived as more sustainable actors on the 
local level and enjoy high social legitimacy (USAID, 2011: 243). However, this 
local legitimacy that local peacebuilding actors focus on is not automatic. Two 
factors need to be taken into account. First, the fact that their insider nature 
also submits them to local social cleavages and second, that there are several 
levels of localization. With regard to the first, the war in Ituri has fundamen-
tally polarized society according to ethnicity. Therefore, local organizations 
either enjoy legitimacy in one or the other ethnic community depending on the 
background of their staff. This reminds us that such local peacebuilding 
actors “can also reflect social dynamics and reinforce pre-existing cultural or 
social divisions, e.g. the dominance of one particular ethnic group” (Haider, 
2009: 8). Thus, the legitimacy of local actors was, especially in the immediate 
34 Interview #93 with UN representative 
(national staff), Bunia, 2012.
35 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding ac-
tors, Bunia, 2011.




aftermath of the war, often impaired depending on the composition of their 
staff. Pertaining to the second factor, legitimacy is conferred at an even more 
nuanced level of locality than ordinary schemes of ‘international versus local’ 
allow for. This means that local peacebuilding actors with their offices in 
Bunia, for instance, are also sometimes seen as outsiders in villages in Ituri 
even though it is the same district. The conferral of legitimacy is thus highly 
localized. While local peacebuilding actors are not to the same degree 
outsiders as international actors, they are still to some extent outsiders and 
also have to establish their legitimacy (see Anderson and Olson, 2003: 36). The 
difference with international actors is that local peacebuilding actors usually 
know better how to establish their legitimacy and work with the communities 
in order to build it. 
 Three aspects illustrate how local peacebuilding actors purposefully 
work to overcome these challenges in order to (re-)establish their local legit-
imacy. First, working in networks helped them to overcome the problem of 
legitimacy in an ethnically divided society. Even the city of Bunia was divided 
according to ethnicity, with one ethnic group on the one side and the other 
ethnic group on the other side. Thus, while local peacebuilding organizations 
sometimes still had mixed staff, it was very difficult as anyone ‘working with 
the enemy’ was seen as a traitor. As such, every local organization also 
became associated with the one or the other side depending on which ethnic 
group dominated within their staff. For this reason, local peacebuilding 
organizations could not work by themselves anymore because they would only 
have had access to one side. Therefore, they established a network of 
different actors joining forces for peace. This network, called the Réseau Haki 
Na Amani (RHA)37 is mostly composed of local NGOs and church groups. This 
allowed them to be the first example for inter-ethnic reconciliation and gave 
them access to zones where they could not have gone alone.  
 Second, they underline that they always start with the communities. As 
they say “if you don’t involve the communities you will always have gaps in the 
results”.38 Their activities are based on needs assessments and they have 
specific structures for gathering information from local communities and 
tailoring their programs in response. They, for instance, always associate the 
local chiefs and identify beneficiaries together with them. Their context 
knowledge also helps them to identify other – less official – community 
leaders to work with. For outsiders, it is often difficult to recognize such 
community leaders and they hence usually work with the first person 
presenting him- or herself as such. Local peacebuilding actors also sensitize 
communities before implementing programs. This, as they explain, is based on 
the fact that local communities have to understand the programs and see the 
benefits in order to engage. How important this is illustrates the fact that in 
the beginning of the international presence in Ituri, communities sometimes 
had difficulties to understand that something was purely ‘for them’ with no 
strings attached.39 They were therefore quite suspicious and often did not 
continue the activities once international peacebuilding actors had left. For 
the latter, however, it seemed almost unthinkable that people would not 
37 The name is in Swahili and means 
Network Justice and Peace.
38 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding  
actors, Bunia, 2011.
39 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding 
actors, Bunia, 2011; Interview #21 
with local peacebuilding actor, Mahagi, 
2011; Interview #36 with local peace-
building actor, Nyankunde, 2012.
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‘appreciate’ their assistance and thus they did not invest a lot in explaining the 
rationale of the programs and follow-up procedures. However, this would have 
been necessary in order to ensure sustainability. 
 Finally, local peacebuilding actors, aware of the highly localized 
conferral of legitimacy, also often created local infrastructures for peace-
building. As one member of a local peacebuilding organization stated “there 
can be a global strategy for peace, but every region has felt the crisis in a 
different manner so the strategy needs to be adapted case by case”.40 The 
clearest indications of this localization are the local structures that the RHA 
has created. They have assembled 127 Initiatives Locales de Paix (ILP) and 93 
Noyaux Pacifistes des Mamans (NPM) in different villages to involve commu-
nities. These structures are trained and engage in local conflict resolution. For 
instance, if two people are in conflict, the local chief invites the two parties 
and often asks a member of the ILP to support him. The ILPs and NPMs also 
facilitate the diffusion of messages which is highly important in a context 
where travelling is not always feasible.
 In sum, these approaches speak directly to the communities and thus 
enjoy legitimacy as they are based on the intimate local understandings of 
peacebuilding. The RHA is the most telling example. The RHA and its ILP and 
NPM are widely known in society and with local chiefs. When the conflict was 
still ongoing, the RHA members “were the first in Bunia to go out which was 
remarkable and they were very much appreciated”.41 Many of the communities 
expressed “this is the first time that people come; it is the first time that we 
get these kinds of meetings”.42 Thus, as stated above, the RHA has clearly 
established itself in the district as one of the main actors working for peaceful 
social cohabitation. Other organizations are equally well received, but work on 
smaller scales and are thus not known throughout the district. 
 Thus, local peacebuilding actors mainly focus on establishing their local 
legitimacy. Even though this local legitimacy is not automatic, they have 
managed to widely build it. At the same time, local peacebuilding actors also 
increasingly try to have more direct access to donor money as stated above. 
Therefore, they often conduct a balancing act between keeping their legit-
imacy in local communities while at the same time satisfying the demands of 
their international partners or donors. 
3.2  International Peacebuilding Actors’ Outside 
 Orientation
International actors, in turn, usually refer to outside sources when legitimizing 
their presence. These sources are threefold: reference is often made to UN 
Security Council resolutions which give an intervention its legality under 
international law, to an agreement between the host government and the 
intervening organization which respects the principle of consent or to the 
40 FGD #1 with local peacebuilding  
actors, Bunia, 2011.
41 Interview #112 with external expert, 
phone, 2013.
42 Interview #112 with external expert, 
phone, 2013.
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values of the ‘liberal peace’ (Wiharta, 2009: 96, 98; see also Campbell, 2011: 
99). If reference to local aspects is made, it is with regard to the behavior of 
international personnel on the ground but in general, the expatriate officials 
are more concerned with their international image than with the one in local 
public opinion (Pouligny, 2006: 154). They assume that international legitimacy 
“automatically translates into domestic legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts in 
post-conflict countries” (Sending, 2009: 2). 
 One of the reasons for this outside orientation is, again, the fact that the 
liberal content of programs is seen as non-negotiable (Richmond, 2004: 88). 
This also refers back to capacities: international peacebuilding actors portray 
themselves as capable and knowledgeable about how to build peace, while 
local actors allegedly do not possess this capacity. Thus, the programs 
promoting liberal values are ipso facto considered legitimate, moving the 
question of how local communities and peacebuilding actors perceive the 
programs to a secondary level of importance (Sending, 2009: 15; Roberts, 
2012b: 5). This is reinforced by the fact that the UN’s status as an institution 
“approximating universality gives it a position as the organization which 
exercises the political function of collective legitimization” (Wilén, 2009: 347). 
 
 Therefore, in the view of international peacebuilding actors, interna-
tional sources confer an objective legitimacy to international peacebuilding 
operations and are thus preferable to local sources of legitimacy which are 
often not even taken into consideration (Sending, 2009: 5). However, interna-
tional legitimacy does not automatically translate into local legitimacy. 
Rather, local legitimacy still “remains to be established in the country of 
intervention – an aspect too often ignored” (Pouligny, 2006: 180). This is why 
contemporary international peacebuilding often lacks legitimacy on the 
ground because it is based on assumptions about what peace means to 
people on the ground influenced by their belief in the 'liberal peace' theory, 
rather than what the people themselves perceive to be the priorities for 
peacebuilding (Roberts, 2012a: 367). 
 This outside orientation has also increased pressure to show results 
based on the recent turn towards results-orientation in peacebuilding (see 
Bächtold et al., 2013). The visibility signs mentioned before are an example for 
this. When asking a head of an international organization if they could stop 
using such signs and use the money in other ways he said “no, unless you want 
to lose all the donors as well”.43 This results-orientation also involves regular 
monitoring and evaluation visits which are often perceived by local peace-
building actors to be a farce. As one respondent stated, when they “send their 
representatives to discuss their work, they are big institutions, you cannot 
criticize them. And even if you do, they often do not write it in the report”.44 
The fact that most evaluations are done by international, rather than local 
actors is also often lamented and said to demonstrate by whose standards 
achievements are measured. Moreover, international actors often “do not 
want to go to the field as they do not want their shoes to get dirty”.45 Some 
upward accountability might be necessary to provide the donors with 
43 Informal discussion #131 with inter-
national organization representative 
(international staff), Bunia, 2013.
44 FGD #40 with local peacebuilding 
actors, Bunia, 2012.
45 Informal discussion #132 with inter-
national organization representative 
(national staff), Bunia, 2013.
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information of what has happened to the funds (Bächtold et al., 2013: 11). 
However, at the same time international peacebuilding actors often take their 
local legitimacy for granted “without seriously considering the degree to 
which, for local actors, legitimacy must be rooted in their own history and 
political culture” (Donais 2012, 18). Thus, the incentive structures as well as 
the criteria by which international peacebuilding actors measure their perfor-
mance are both oriented towards the outside, rather than the inside (de 
Coning 2012, 82). Due to this outside orientation, it is often not seen as 
necessary to include local peacebuilding actors in strategic decisions because 
the main partners in this are considered to be the host governments and 
donors. 
 In sum, the different perceptions of legitimacy which exist amongst 
international and local peacebuilding actors mean that local actors are faced 
with a balancing act between ensuring their legitimacy on the ground and 
increasingly trying to also have more direct access to donor money. For 
international actors, their orientation remains largely towards the outside 
– despite lofty claims of ensuring local ownership – which often hampers their 
local legitimacy.
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Conclusion
This working paper has assessed the interaction between local and interna-
tional peacebuilding actors in Ituri. It has illustrated why the interaction is 
often characterized by rivalry and how the lack of cooperation makes both 
international and local programs less effective. It has argued that the reason 
for the lack of cooperation, rather than the power asymmetry between them, 
is that local and international peacebuilding actors have different assess-
ments of their resources, capacities and legitimacy structures. Thereby, this 
paper has on the one hand provided an alternative explanation for the lack of 
cooperation between international and local peacebuilding actors, and on the 
other hand it has suggested an additional element in explaining peacebuilding 
success and failures. 
 International peacebuilding actors often see local actors as highly 
donor dependent and justify indirect funding to them on the grounds of due 
diligence. At the same time, they value their own thematic knowledge as an 
important capacity while they treat the context knowledge local peacebuilding 
actors hold often as simple information, used mainly to adapt their programs 
in the implementation phase. Finally, they are largely focused on outside 
legitimacy and assume that it automatically translates into local legitimacy. 
From local peacebuilding actors’ perspectives, international actors are at 
least equally donor dependent as they often leave quickly as soon as the 
budget finishes. They perceive their context knowledge as capacity equal to 
the thematic knowledge of international actors and they are mostly concerned 
with their inside legitimacy, i.e. their acceptance in the communities where 
they work. 
 Due to the fact that international peacebuilding actors do not suffi-
ciently recognize local resources, capacities and legitimacy, they often design 
their strategies with host governments and donors, rather than with local 
peacebuilding actors. To be sure, they consult with the latter, but only at the 
implementation stage to fine-tune their programs. At the same time, local 
peacebuilding actors adapt their programs to international priorities as they 
depend on their financial resources. Thereby, they can help to make interna-
tional programs more locally legitimate. However, as they are not consulted in 
the strategy-making phase, they can only conduct marginal adaptations 
during implementation. This shows that while peacebuilding in Ituri has clearly 
become hybrid and neither local nor international peacebuilding actors can 
implement their programs without adaptations, the space in which this 
hybridity is negotiated remains dominated by international peacebuilding 
actors. 
 If local and international peacebuilding actors had more balanced views 
on resources, capacities and legitimacy, they could work according to each 
other’s comparative advantages, rather than in rivalry. Local peacebuilding 
actors have distinct comparative advantages as they work in a highly cost-
efficient way, know how to navigate the local context and how to establish 
local legitimacy. International actors, in turn, have access to donor resources, 
valuable technical capacities and know how to establish international 
26
legitimacy. Thus, while local actors can facilitate access to communities and 
improve the local relevance of international programs, international actors 
can help local actors in increasing their scale of activities and getting access 
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